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Food Drug$Cosmetic law
The Basis
of Strict Products Liability.
.By REED DICKERSON
This -Paper Was Presented Before the Division of Food Drug Cos-
metic Law, Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the
American Bar Association at the Annual Meeting in St. Louis, August
9. It Is a Companion Paper to "Restatement or Reformation?" by
William J. Condon, Which Appeared in the August, 1961 Issue of
This Magazine. Mr. Dickerson Is Professor of Law at Indiana Uni-
versity and Author of Products Liability and the Food Consumer.
AT THE 1961 MEETING of the American Law Institute, the Re-
porter for the Rcstatement of the Law of Torts, Second, Dean Wil-
liam L. Prosser, proposed that the following new section be inserted:
Section 402A. Special Liability of Sellers of Food.-One engaged
in the business of selling food for human consumption who sells such
food in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the consumer
is subject to liability for bodily harm thereby caused to one who con-
sumes it, even though (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in
the preparation and sale of the food, and (b) the consumer has not
bought the food from or entered into any contractual relation with the
seller.
Before turning to what I consider the solid merits of the proposed
section, let me mention several reservations and the related questions
that they raise. The first of these relates not so much to the text of




the section explains that the term "food" is intended to include all
products for ingestion by humans, including drugs that are so con-
sumed. On the other hand, the comment also tells us that "food" does
not include clothing or hair dye. In view of the modern tendency to
legislate by legisl~tive history, this statement is generously reassuring!
Even so, the comment invites strong misgivings. If the authors
mean to cover so wide an area, why should they not say so in the
section itself? Moreover, the category is broadened to include ingested
drugs, other problems arise. First, as the critics of the section have
been quick to point out, it becomes harder to support the proposed
section as a "restatement" of the law. Second, it becomes harder to
find policy reasons to support a section that goes so far and no farther.
Why, for example, should privity-free liability be imposed in the case
of an ingested drug and not in the case of a nasal spray or a sup-
pository ? It is ironical that, according to the interpretative comments,
it would include a tularemic rabbit that infected a chef who merely
handled it, but exclude a surgical nail that was consumed internally.
The essential undesirability of the stopping place proposed by the
official comments was so apparent that the institute voted to extend
the principle expressed by the proposed section to cover all products
for intimate bodily use. While this makes more consistent sense from
a policy standpoint, it makes it correspondingly harder to call the
proposed section a "restatement" of current law.
One of the most interesting features of the proposed section 402A
is that it says nothing at all about implied warranty. The comments
to the section explain that this is done for several reasons. First,
warranty traditionally requires reliance on some promise or represen-
tation of the seller, which would be hard to spell out in a situation in
which the consumer may not even know or care who sold the product.
Second, although warranty has some of the aspects of tort, many
courts insist that it is inseparable from a sale between the parties.
Third, warranties are covered by the Uniform Sales Act, which has
been construed by many courts to exclude warranties to anyone other
than the immediate buyer. Fourth and fifth, additional problems relat-
ing respectively to damages and disclaimers integral with the concept
of warranty should, of possible, be avoided. Finally, it would be anomalous
to include in the restatement one kind of warranty while excluding all
others. All these problems are swept aside by the simple device of
not mentioning the naughty word "warranty."
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This line of reasoning baffles me. How can merely classifying
such a responsibility as a new tort obligati6n make it any less a
warranty, especially when many authbrities,:including some courts,
have long contended that breach of warranty should be treated as a
tort? Moreover, the mere use or avoidance of a name has not been
notably successful in preventing the courts from doing their own
classifying. Courts sophisticated enough to pierce the corporate veil
or to declare a statute general in form special in substanc*e c.an cer-
tainly penetrate a label or, conversely, supply a missing one.
Is the obligation described in the proposed section 402A in effect
a warranty? It has most, if not all, of the characteristics of a war-
ranty: It performs the function of a warranty. It relates to the
quality of the goods. It is engrafted on a sale. It affects a relationship
dealt with by the Uniform Sales Act. What, then, is lacking? Cer-
tainly, the mere absence 6f an actual promise or representation is not
significant in view of the long history of the warranty implied in law.
The problem may become largely academic in view of the appar-
ent indifference of the courts in some states to the language of the
Uniform Sales Act and in view of the replacement of that act by the'
Uniform Commercial Code in others.
Within the area of its coverage, the proposed section 402A would
(1) do away with the privity requirement at all levels of manufac-
turing and distribution, and (2) impose on each seller coming within
its terms the responsibility of strict liability.
In doing away with privity, would the proposed section reflect the
preponderance of existing law, or would it pull itself up by its own
bootstraps by purporting to reflect law that it was only creating?
So far as food is concerned, a good case can be made for calling this a
true restatement of at least a majority of the courts that have ex-
pressed themselves on the subject. For drugs and cosmetics and other
products for intimate bodily use, on the other hand, the trend toward
abolishing the privity requirement has lagged far behind. Although in.
this area it would seem difficult to sustain the proposed section as a
;restatement," its authors contend that the great bulk of the privity
cases are. old ones not fully representative of current judicial thinking.
While it may be desirable for the American Law Institute not to
mislabel its own products, the question of how fully the substance of
section 402A reflects existing law hardly affects the merits of the rule
of law that it states. Whatever difficulties there may be in rational-
STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY PACE 587
izing that section as a restatement of current law, there is little occa-
sion for extended mourning over the death of the privity requirement.
For food, it is time for the funeral and, if present indications are
reliable,. it is only a matter of time before the privity requirement will
be dead for most other products as well.
The privity requirement made a lot of sense in the kind of casual
transaction that took place between two farmers in the simple sale of
a horse, where the seller had no reason to be concerned in the trans-
action beyond his immediate buyer. If the buyer later resold the horse.
that was likely to be a wholly independent and unrelated transaction.
How different the pattern of mass distribution of complicated, fabri-
cated goods is today. The manufacturer knows, when he sells to a
primary distributor, wholesaler, or retailer, where the goods are ulti-
mately going, and he is equally interested with them in seeing that the
goods get there. In such a climate, the factual presuppositions of the
original privity doctrine seem unreal.
Some courts have begun to see that, whether or not they consti-
tute express warranties, manufacturers' advertising appeals today are
aimed primarily at the consumer, over the heads of any 'intervening
distributors. This either makes the privity requirement a meaningless
anachronism or allows us to argue, with good logic, that even if there
is still a privity requirement the manufacturer and consumer comply
with it because in effect they deal face to face.
One of the most persistent arguments for the retention of the
privity requirement is that it gives the manufacturer a needed shield
against the fraudulent claim. A high percentage of claims for products
liability appears to be either downright fraudulent or, more often, valid
in part but grossly exaggerated.
Although there is reason to be sympathetic with the manufacturer
in his predicament, the privity requirement is for this purpose wholly
unselective. It gives the manufacturer a welcome defense against the
fraudulent claim, but it also lets him out when, as often happens, he is
confronted with a valid one. Some manufacturers will undoubtedly
answer that, as a matter of grace, they often make an appropriate
settlement of an honest claim even though they are not legally ac-
countable. Unfortunately, this leaves the consumer at the mercy of
the manufacturer. I suspect that some manufacturers are not so generous.
Moreover, the manufacturer is no more vulnerable to a fraudulent
warranty suit than he is to a fraudulent negligence suit. Most manu-
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facturers are already stripped of privity protection in negligence suits
and, if they do any direct selling, in warranty suits as well. No plain-
tiff can fake the defendant's negligence as such, but he can and often
does fake causation. For this reason, it seems that so far as the
chances of fraud are concerned there is no real difference between a
products liability suit brought on the theory of negligence and one
brought on the theory of warranty.
The privity requirement is an anachronism that we would do well
to get rid of as soon as possible, at least in the mercantile context that
we have been considering. The probler to which the legislatures and
the courts must now address themselves is that of defining the kind
of liability to which the manufacturer should be exposed.... .While
manufacturer's direct liability is not necessarily strict liability; that
is the likely result if he is made directly accountable to the consumer.
The remainder of this discussion will therefore be directed to two
general questions relating to strict liability: (1) Should the manufac-
turer be strictly liable to the consumer? (2) If so, what should .this
liability consist of?
As to the first question, it seems clear that the manufacturer.
should be so liable, and for the following reasons.
Strict liability provides an effective means of bolstering direct
controls in encouraging the manufacturer to make. a safe product.
Experience indicates that this encouragement is an effective one and
the only remaining question is whether this kind of preventive measure
is necessary or desirable.
One basic objection to strict liability has been advanced by none
less thai Dean Roscoe Pound.. Vriting in 1950 (36 American Bar
Association Journal 977, at p. 981). Pound attacked what P iofessor
James and others are calling "enterprise liability" (e. g., 24 Tennessee
Law Review 928 (1957)) as a kind of "welfare" measure better left to
legislation and having even a touch of Marxism. Others havw found
in it part of the drift toward governmental paternalism. Although I
have the profoundest. respect for this: great legal philosopher, it seems
likely that in statements such as these he and the others have failed
to take adequate account of the. currents that have made it'necessary
and even desirable to arm the consumer civilly. Such views not only
make false assumptions about 'the nature of, strict liability but are
based on an outworn view of the position that the consumer holds
in t'ie general marketing scheme. .
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In Adam Smith's self-regulating economy, it was assumed that
buyer and seller bargained, and sellers competed, in a climate of rela-.
tive equality. Compare an economy in which the goods are so compli-
cated, manufacturers are so removed from the consumers they ultimately
serve and the relative sophistication of consumer buyer and corporate
seller is so disparate, that the consumer is at the mercy of those who
are supposed to serve him, unless the law adds its counterweight.
As against the contention of Dean Pound made in 1950, consider
the views of an equally eminent legal philosopher, writing in 1960
(40 Boston University Law Review 167, at pp. 183, 185) :
. . . we must break away from the idea of fault as the fundamental and
exclusive ground of liability . . . Must we not seek repair of injuries incurred
as incidents of what is done with no intent or purpose of causing injury, but
involving in the course of carrying it on . . . great possibility of injury to others?
What eminent legal philosopher said this? Surprisingly enough,
it was Dean Roscoe Pound, who in the meantime had apparently
drastically revised his views. Incidentally, there is no reason to think
of strict liability as some new, alien development. The retailer has
long been strictly accountable to the consumer. For food, this
responsibility goes back'probably to the 13th century. In fact, the
earliest tort liabilitv did not even distinguish between the intentional
and the accidental..
Assuming that the consumer should be protected against the over-
reaching manufacturer or other seller, buyer and seller can be put on
a more equal basis in two ways. First, by direct governmental regu-
lation such as the enactment of pure food laws. Second, by arming
the consumer with civil remedies and defenses designed to give him
more adequate means of looking after himself. As one who has
spent more than 16 years as a 'Washington bureaucrat, I have come
to look at direct government participation as a second-choice approach.
In principle at least, it would seem preferable to let the consumer fight
his own battles and to help .him do.it by giving.him enough private
legal weapons and factual information that he will have some chance
of striking an effective blow in his own behalf. Unfoi;tunately, in the
field of food and, other products for intimate bodily use, it looks as if
we may need bot4 approaches.
Prevention through civil liability: normally gives the manufacturer
two alternatives. He can try to improve his product to make it rea-
sonably safe, and he can help the 'consumer protect himself, at little
cost to the manufacturer, by including with the product adequate
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warnings or directions for use. Such an approach 'has reduced the
liability of sellers of rotary lawn mowers and, in view of the apparent
feasibility of including cooking instructions with pork products, it is
surprising that sellers of pork continue to complain about trichinosis
judgments.
The second argument for strict liability is that it makes possible
a sharing of the risk or loss among consumers generally. So far as
the manufacturer is induced by civil liability to improve his product
and reflect in his prices the costs of improvement, he can be said to
be "spreading the risk." So far as such improvements are unsuccess-
ful and he is induced to reflect in his prices the costs of paying injury
claims, he can be said to be spreading the loss." Such price increases
provide a kind of industry-wide self insurance.
What about the seller's ability to absorb or pass on to the con-
sumer the costs of further improvements, additional precautions,
increased recoveries, or product liability insurance? As I pointed out
on another occasion (16 Bus. Law. 683 (1961)):
Where the financial, burden is shared by an entire industry, no problem
appears to be presented, because even under highly competitive conditions the
industry as a whole can adjust its general price level to reflect cost increases.
A problem would appear to arise only for a manufacturer whose particular prod-
uct or method of operations exposes him to risks not shared by others in the
same highly competitive industry. A pos'sible example might be carbonated
drinks in glass, with its explosion hazard, as against carbonated drinks in tin.
with no corresponding hazard. But even here; average costs of, this kind would
seem to be relatively trivial as compared to cost increments such as wage in-
creases. So far, there is nothing to indicate that the imposition of strict liability
has had an adverse affect on any seller who has-taken the precaution of covering
the worst of his risks with a deductible product liability policy.
One commonly met objection to strict liability for defective fabri-,
cated goods is that it expresses a kind of subversive, "deep pocket"
philosophy: If someone who cannot afford the loss gets hurt, let
someone who can afford to do so underwrite it; in this case, a rich
manufacturer or distributor. Of course, even this interpretation of
strict liability would not let the injured consumer grab at random for
a rich indemnitor. It would at least limit liability to those who had
a causal connection with the consumer's injury by being in the chain
of manufacturing and distribution.
Here is where I believe many of the opponents of strict liability
have been impliedly misrepresenting it. What do we mean by "strict
liar ility" ?
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It is commonly assumed that to make out a case of strict products
liability all the plaintiff has to show is that the defendant caused the
plaintiff's injury. Here, we should distinguish between strict Ila-
bility, on the one hand, and strict strict liability (what someone has
recently called "liability without warranty"), on the other. By "strict
strict liability," I refer to the kind of liability that is imposed under
workmen's compensation, where all the claimant has to show is the
causal relationship involved in an injury arising out of and in the
course of his employment.
Under simple strict liability, on the other hand, and thatis what
we are considering here, it is not to be assumed that, if the courts do
away with the privity requirement and expose the manufacturer to
strict liability, he will automatically have to indemnify every person
who is injured by one of his products. For example, the proposed
section 402A does not say that the seller must pay'the consumer some
money if his product injures the consumer. The food must be, first,
"defective" and second, "unreasonably dangerous." Not everything
that causes injury or illness is either defective or unreasonably dangerous.
Some of those who tend to panic in the face of possible strict liability
do not fully realize that strict liability need not be so strict that the
only issue is one of causation.
Although I had long thought that the question whether the prod-
uct wa s unreasonably dangerous was simply the most reliable way to
measure defectiveness, making the latter term surplusage, the word
"defective" was retained in section 402A on the ground that it was
needed to nail down the kind of case in which the product was
improperly made; and to excuse the manufacturer of a highly dangerous
article that was properly made. Apparently, it was feared that with-
out. t!be w.ord "defective" a highly dangerous )roduct might be con-
sidered -to be ipso facto unreasonably dangerous.- Under the section
as,.it, now.,stands, it is interesting to speculate as to what kind of
situation, , vld exist in which the product was "unreasonably
dangerous',' without being legally "defective."
'In any 'event, it is important to formulate appropriate concepts
of what is "defective" and what is "unreasonably dangerous." How
these concepts are developed will determine the ultimate impact of
doing away with the privity requirement and imposing strict liability.
The appropriate development of these concepts can. also furnish the
key to such difficult legal problems as those involved in trichinosis,
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allergies, disclaimers, -and warnings. While the most provocative
questions appear to be arising outside the field of food, much needs
yet to be done to clarify the law relating to food.
In the traditional suit for negligence, the main problem beyond
"that of causation is to stigmatize the acti(ois or omissions of the
defendant. Under strict liability,'on' the other hand, the problem of
stigmatizing the defendant is apparently removed. Even so, the
plaintiff must stigmatize the product as "defective" and "unreason-
ably dangerous." In the usual food case, this is a simple matter. A
mouse is enough to stigmatize a bottle of soft drink. Staphylococcus
is enough to stigmatize a custard-filled eclair. Both are legally "defec-
tive." Both are "unreasonably dangerous."
Unfortunately, such simple and typical instances do not give us
a readv key to a concept of "defectiveness" on which products liability
generally should be based. Let us consider several specific problems.
In the field of food, the courts are still fighting the battle of the
chicken pie. Is a chicken bone in a chicken dish enough to make it
legally defective? While many courts use the test of whether the
offending object is "foreign" or "natural" to the product, the most
sensible test, which is adopted by many other courts, is the "reason-
able expectations" test: Is the offending condition one that con-
sumers normally ainticipate and guard against? Here, a philosophy
of consumer protection based on the reasonable expectations of the
parties helps to supply a sensible answer.
-What about trichinae in pork? Here, again,,the "reasonable
expectations" test seems to offer a helpful approach. Do normal con-
sumer precautions include cooking pork to the thermal death point of
trichinae? If so, trichinous pork can well be considered as not being
legally defective. If this approach is correct, we cannot evaluate a
product merely by looking at it or by measuring the harm that it can
potentially do to a consumer. 'We must appraise it also in the context
of what people usually expect and guard against in the kind of situa-
tion presented. The problem of defining a legal defect arises also for
allergies, for which the courts are beginning to find. satisfactory
answers in the reasonable expectations of the parties.
The concept of defectiveness of a product depends ultimately
on the concept of what the offending "product" is. This, in turn,
includes the concepts of contemplated use and contemplated perform-
ance. 'What may be legally adequate for one purpose may be legally
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inadequate for another. Thus, even within the framework of strict
liability the manufacturer may have an escape hatch in the concept
of contemplated or normal use. For example, in Mannsz v. Mac Whytc
Co., 155 F. 2d 445 (CA-3, 1946), 13 NEGLIGENCE CASES 524, the defend-
ant manufacturer of wire rope got off the legal hook, even without
the help of the privity requirement, because the plaintiff's use of the
rope in question, which was to support a scaffold, was one abnormal to
that kind of rope.
The drug cases present problems that are hard to solve even with
the help of a sophisticated philosophy of consumer protection. Part
of the problem lies in the fact'that for many drugs no clear concept
of "normal use" has yet emerged. Chemical X may be good-for
curing flea bites, fair for curing eczema, and poor for curing seborrhea.
What expectations have sufficiently crystallized to serve as a criterion here?
One of the strongest arguments against the extension of strict
liability is that it would impede the development of new products.
But, again, how serious this might be depends on how "strict" the
strict liability is. Within the concepts of "defective" and "unreason-
ably dangerous," this ultimately depends on how the interest in pro-
tecting the reasonable expectations of consumers is balanced against
the interest in not making unreasonable demands on the capacity of
manufacturers to provide this protection. If the manufacturer is
aware of the potential danger, normally he can either improve the
product by removing or minimizing the danger or provide a suitable
warning or suitable directions for use.
The crucial case, of course, is that of the new product whose
benefits have fanned the expectations of consumers but whose latent
dangers, which may be considerable, have not yet been revealed.
Thus, the big issue in the non-food cases today is whether a product
is to be considered as legally defective, even under strict liability,
when it produces serious harm at a time when not even scientists are
adequately aware of its potentialities. For aircraft the Electras pro-
vide a beautiful example. Some precedent exists for saying that a
product is not legally defective until at least scientists know its
dangers. Thus, in the allergy cases courts that permit recovery make
it a condition of liability that the product have an ingredient that is
known to be capable of inflicting harm on a significant, generally
determinable percentage of the public.
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While this approach has some judicial acceptance, fears have been
expressed that a similar approach to new products not yet known by
scientists to be unreasonably dangerous, by giving manufacturers one
free shot at the public, make them guinea pigs for products_ that
should have been more adequately tested before being marketed. On
the other hand, even Dean Prosser, reporter for the restatement, has
expressed sympathy with the objective of protecting the still ignorant
manufacturer of a new drug product. That such notions can be
accommodated within the concepts of "defective" and "unreasonably
dangerous" should comfort those who have been thinking that all
would be lost if the current assault on the citadel of privity is ulti-
mately successful, as it most probably will be.
On this perplexing problem, it is hard to take sides. It is not
even clear that what makes sense for one kind of product makes sense
for another. 'For present purposes, the important point is that these
issues can be resolved according to the best dictates of public policy
within the framework of strict liability itself; that is, through the
concepts of what', under the circumstances, the law is to consider
"defective" and "unreasonably dangerous." It is unnecessary, there-
fore, to reject the advantages of strict liability to cope with this.
problem.
It is, indeed, a gross exaggeration to'put at opposite poles what
represent only modest differences in degree. On the one hand, even
liability. for negligence is a kind of strict liability so far as it holds a
person to a general standard of conduct without regard to his peculiar
idiosyncrasies. On the other hand, strict liability, despite its name,
also deals with the defendant's conduct and differs only in that it
substitutes what has been called in other contexts a "performance
standard" for a standard that deals with specific conduct. In short.
this kind of strict liability differs from negligence only in eliminating
the necessity of proving specific acts of negligence.
This fact provides one more reason for supporting strict liability.
What we have been calling liability based on fault in the products
cases has been for the most part strict liability. The reported cases
indicate that the courts have rarely been able to try a bona fide negli-
gence issue in the field of products liability, particularly in the case
of food, because the specific facts surrounding the defect are rarely
known to 'either party. In practice, if the plaintiff can persuade the
jur - that the defect was in the product when it left the defendant's
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platli, 7the' inferences are usually drawn in his favor on the theoretical
issue of' negligence, with or without an assist from the doctrine of
ries ips'' loquittir or -that of negligence per se. Because this is only
paying lip service to' culpability, the privity requirement has probably
served'only to driv'6' strict liability into the legal underground.
Even apart from the'hypocrisy involved, law suits should not be
cluttered 'with pretended legal issues that in most cases are neither,
being litigated nor susceptible of being litigated. Strangely enough,
the imposition of strict liability will affect the trial of products lia-,
bility cases very little; beyond eliminating some of the formal legal
arguments that lawyers noV1 make. The central factual issue in a
products liability case will continue to be what it has been all along:
Assuming that the product that injured the plaintiff was legally
"defective" and "unreasonably dangerous," can the condition be
traced to the defendant's plant? •
I While we may feel some nostalgia for the fading issue of privity,
we will do better to direct our efforts to solving the two central
problems of strict liability today, those of "defectiveness" and proof
of causation.
The issue of strict liability is no longer, ".whether" but "of what
kind." [The End]
COMMISSIONER LARRICK SPEAKS ON QUACKERY
Commissioner of Food and Drugs George P.'Larrick said on Octo-
ber 6, that consumers spend more than $1 billion a year "needlessly on
falsely represented drugs, foods and cosmetics." V
Speaking before the National Congress on Medical Quackery at
the Sheraton-Park Hotel, Commissioner Larrick said that the cost of
vitamin and so-called health food quackery. alone has been "estimated
conservatively at $500 million a year." The Congress was sponsored
by the American Medical Association and the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration.
Mr. Larrick said that there were three major kinds of quackery
from the standpoint of protecting the public by both law enforcement
and education-fake medical devices, pseudo science in nutrition, and
false claims for drugs and cosmetics.
"From the standpoint of consumer protection the greatest harm
being done by quack devices today results from continued use of indi-
vidual units by local pract-itioners," he said. "For this reason, we are
making public today a list of devices which have been outlawed by
court proceedings under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, and
wfhich we have cause to believe are still extant and still being used.
"The most widespread and expensive 'type of quackery in the United
States today is in the promotion of vitamin products, special dietary
foods, and food supplements." Mr. Larrick appealed for help from
healifh and nutrition educators at all levels to stem the tide of quackery.
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